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POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL ROUTE
PLANNING BY THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD*
By EDWARD C. SWEENEY
Professor of Law at Northwestern University and Editor of Jous-
NAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, on leave to U.S. Senate Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee as Professional Staff Member
(Aviation). Recently, Survey Officer for Committee on Independent
Regulatory Commissions of (Hoover) Commission on Organization
of the Executive Branch of the Government.
A T the beginning of World War II, the Pan American Airways Sys-
tem was the only international United States airline. Although
the Board had certificated American Export Airlines to operate across
the North Atlantic that company had failed to secure the necessary mail
pay appropriations from Congress which would enable it to commence
service. At that time the Pan American Airways System had an exten-
sive network throughout Central America, the Caribbean, and South
America. It operated across the Pacific to Hong Kong, from Seattle
into Alaska, and had begun service across the North Atlantic to Great
Britain and France. Notwithstanding this far-flung Pan American net-
work, many important trade centers in Europe and Asia were still not
tied to the United States by air routes.
When the war compelled the operation of extensive military and na-
val air services they were successful on trans-oceanic service on a global
scale. Under contract with ATC and NATS the domestic air carriers
supplied a large portion of this military transport lift. Their success
demonstrated to the Civil Aeronautics Board in the first year of the war
that the technique of overseas air transport operations could be mas-
tered by domestic air carriers as well as by Pan American, and that
multi-engine aircraft had been perfected which, with proper navigation
instruments and communications facilities, could make international
air travel an immediate postwar reality.
The Board was also keenly aware that technical progress was not
enough by itself to make postwar international commercial air service a
reality. It was a well established principle of international law that the
sovereignty of each nation extended to the air space and consequently
no aircraft could fly across any international border without consent.
Therefore, permission would be required to fly into and through each
sovereign nation to which air service might be inaugurated. A further
* This article presents the contents of Appendix III-A of the Staff Report on
the Civil Aeronautics Board to the Committee on Independent Regulatory Commis-
sions of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, September-November, 1948.
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complication was wide-spread fear among our allies that the far-flung
military operations of American military transport services might be
arbitrarily exploited for commercial purposes after the war.
Under the Civil Aeronautics Act the peacetime operation of com-
mercial air transport service by United States air carriers requires a
certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. However, the Board realized that this certificate would
be meaningless unless operating rights could be secured from each sov-
ereign country along the proposed route.
In the summer of 1943 the Board pondered the question whether it
should proceed to certify United States carriers over specific routes and
then seek operating rights, or should wait until the United States could
first secure operating rights from the countries on the routes. In either
case it was clear to the Board that it was first necessary to determine the
postwar air routes that the United States should seek to operate for
commercial or strategic reasons.
These questions were presented to an informal committee assem-
bled at the invitation of the Secretary of State to determine postwar air
policies for the President. This committee functioned for two years
under the chairmanship of an Assistant Secretary of State and included
the Assistant Secretaries of War and Navy for Air, the Under Secretary
of Commerce and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
As a result of discussions in the Board and with this committee it
was felt that the fears of our allies with regard to the scope of our post-
war plans would be allayed if this government would announce the air
routes it hoped to operate. Furthermore, such an announcement
would be a helpful preliminary step to the formal hearings leading up
to the issue of certificates to individual United States carriers.
Consequently, the Board on September 2, 1943, issued a press re-
lease announcing that it would make an informal study of international
air transport routes and inviting interested parties to submit sugges-
tions by October 1, 1943, supported by analysis and data. The study
was to be used later as a basis for formal consideration of applications
for certificates of public convenience and necessity involving interna-
tional services. The study was not to involve the determination of the
particular United States carriers by whom service would be operated
but was directed solely to the question of routes.
At the same time the Board advised all the interested government
Departments and committees of Congress of the study it was making.
The Board requested its Analyses Division, in the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Regulation, to make a traffic study of world trade routes. The
division assembled comprehensive statistics on the past and potential
movement of passengers and cargo by ocean vessels and aircraft with
principal emphasis upon movement to and from the United States.
The CAB also prepared studies of the movement of United States over-
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seas mail, passport data, and hotel reservations, and obtained data from
the Board of Economic Warfare.
The general route study was carried on under the personal supervi-
sion of the Board's Chairman, Mr. L. Welch Pogue, with the active
support of its Vice-Chairman, Mr. Edward Warner and with close
administrative assistance from the Chairman's assistant and the Direc-
tor of the International Office of the Board, as well as the Analyses Divi-
sion. Other members showed a keen interest. By confidential letter
the Board sent to the interested Departments on October 7, 1943, a
draft study prepared by the Analyses Division presenting tentative
North Atlantic air routes to the European Mediterranean areas. It in-
cluded factual material and staff interpretation upon which to estimate
the volume of air service necessary to develop the potential traffic.
INTRA AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL LIAISON
Apparently the Departments and Congressional committees did not
initially submit important suggestions or comments. In November,
the State Department outlined informally the air routes it classified as
of primary, secondary and of strategic or military importance. Discus-
sions were held with military and naval authorities and the air trans-
port routes of these services were studied in detail. The Board also
conferred with representatives of Pan-American Airways and with
domestic air carriers and steamship companies who had applications on
file to fly overseas or intended to file such applications. The Analyses
Division prepared numerous maps and mileage tables showing various
route combinations.
On January 26, 1944, the Board wrote the Director of the Budget
and the War, Navy, Post Office and Commerce Departments listing the
postwar trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific routes that it had tentatively
concluded should be operated by United States carriers. The Board
emphasized that this route pattern, with whatever desirable modifica-
tions might be suggested by other interested government agencies,
would furnish the basis upon which to enter into negotiations with for-
eign governments at an appropriate time. A copy of these letters was
sent to the Department of State with the statement that the Board con-
sidered it advisable to obtain the views of those Departments before
consulting the Department of State on political aspects of the proposal.
In February 1944, the Bureau of the Budget asked the Board if it
could make an estimate of the annual net cost to the government of fly-
ing these routes, particularly whether they would be (1) supported by
commercial revenue from the beginning, (2) supported after a time or
(3) likely to operate at a loss indefinitely. This difficult request was
again assigned to the Analyses Division.
The Department ,of Commerce made studies of commercial traffic
potentials of the various routes and submitted numerous suggestions to
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the Board. The Department of State gave careful consideration to the
proposed routes and suggested some modifications.
During the course of the study the Senate Committee on Commerce
urged the Board not to issue permanent or temporary certificates for
any international service during the war except temporary certificates
after consultation with the committee. The committee also objected to
the preparation of a route plan on the ground that it was not compat-
ible with the Board's responsibilities under the Civil Aeronautics Act,
and apparently on the ground that it might adversely affect the commit-
tee's plan to sponsor a single company to operate all United States over-
seas air services, i. e., the chosen instrument. Executive sessions were
held by the committee with members of the Board.
The War and Navy Departments referred the route plans to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff who, due to the urgency of war problems, did not
give much attention to the matter but indicated reluctance to approve
any plan because of the possibility that suspicion of our intentions
might interfere with the war effort. However, the Board took the mat-
ter up with the Army'Air Forces and since it was apparent that the mili-
tary transport routes might serve as a. valuable foundation for postwar
air services, eventually obtained War Department approval. Moreover,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on May 27, 1944, approved the plan and the
Board's proposal to immediately unfreeze route applications, but sug-
gested that it might be desirable to consult with the Soviet Union in ad-
vance of public release.
Upon receipt of comments and suggestions from the Departments,
the Board conferred with its staff advisors and modified the details of
the route plans. Only routes were retained which led directly out from
the United States with one exception, namely, a route from Natal (Bra-
zil) to southwestern Europe. It included air routes through the Carib-
bean and to South America, but excluding overland routes to Canada.
The revised route plan was again cleared with the Departments and
was submitted to the. President personally by the Chairman of the
Board and was approved.
The proper method of announcing the route plan disturbed some
members of the Board. Because of the requirement of the Act for the
Board to base its certificate decisions upon evidence and a record pre-
sented in formal hearing, the Board had always been reluctant to an-
nounce route plans or standards which might in any way embarrass o-
bind it in subsequent formal proceedings. In December 194.9, the
Board did not contemplate publication of the plan but, as it tentatively
agreed upon particular routes the Board intended to advise the Depart-
ment of State of its conclusion so that the route could form the basis for
immediate negotiation with foreign countries of operating rights.
After lengthy discussion it was decided that the Board should announce
its study at a press conference and should point out that the study
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would be used only as a basis for formal consideration of applications to
be determined in subsequent proceedings.
On June 12, shortly before the press conference, the Board sent an
advance copy of the plan to the Senate Committee on Commerce and to
other interested committees, advising them that it had become impor-
tant to the public interest to unfreeze applications for authority to en-
gage in foreign air transportation throughout the world and that the
Board intended to make public this policy and the proposed interna-
tional air service which it had decided should be operated by United
States air carriers. All of the Departments of Government and the
President having agreed to the publication of the plan, little opportu-
nity was given for committees of Congress to comment.
At this time a Soviet air mission was in Washington discussing,
among other matters, postwar civil aviation. The route plan proposed
service to Moscow and beyond to some point in China or Afghanistan
and another route across eastern Siberia on a route between Alaska
and China. With the approval of the Department of State and the mili-
tary, the route plan was discussed with the Soviet representatives before
its release. It is understood they made no objection to the proposed
routes or to the announcement of the plan.
On June 14, 1944, the Board held a press conference in its'hearing
chambers and gave out a five-page release in'cluding the list of air
routes set forth in Appendix A. This explained carefully the nature
of the study and the purposes for which it was intended. At the same
time the Board disclosed that applications for authority to operate
these routes would be brought to hearing and final decision by the
Board as rapidly as circumstances would permit. The Department of
State notified all foreign governments concerned in advance that the
announcement of the Board was merely a step taken in following the
statutory requirement of the Civil Aeronautics Act and obviously no
service would be operated until suitable diplomatic arrangements
had been concluded.
Following the release of the public announcement of its route pat-
tern the chief hearing examiner of the Board conferred with the
United States carriers desiring to operate the various routes. Five
separate route proceedings were proposed and applications involving
these areas were consolidated, namely, the North Atlantic Area, the
South Atlantic, North Pacific, Latin America and Central Pacific.
Hearings were arranged to begin in the early fall of 1944 and continued
into the winter.
CONCLUSION
The Board completed its study of the estimated cost to the govern-
ment of operating the proposed routes -and submitted its report to the
Bureau of the Budget on August 21, 1944. The detailed traffic studies
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of surface travel on the principal trade routes of the world, commenced
by the Analyses Division in 1943, were brought to completion and
made public in eight volumes in the fall of 1944 and this data was
used extensively by applicants in the formal proceedings. The various
Departments continued to recommend slight modifications even after
the release of the plan. The route from Brazil to Europe was deleted.
The Board was complimented on the foresight shown in making
this and releasing it to the public and the industry through an open
press conference. The aviation industry and foreign governments were
both assured that the Board had placed reasonable bounds upon its
postwar plans, United States and foreign carriers could plan ac-
cordingly.
The Board's plan, with slight modifications, has been followed in
all of its postwar international route decisions.' While the interna-
tional route pattern is infinitely simpler than the domestic air route
network, the international study would nevertheless appear to indi-
cate procedures valuable in undertaking a revaluation of the domestic
air route systems.
APPENDIX A - THE WORLD PATTERN FOR UNITED STATES CARRIERS,
JUNE 12, 1944
1. New York-a point in Newfoundland or Labrador-a point in Eire-
London-Berlin-Prague-Vienna-Istanbul-Cairo
2. New York-a point in Newfoundland or Labrador-a point in Eire-
Paris-a point in Switzerland-Rome-Athens-Cairo-Basra-Ka-
rachi-Calcutta






5. New York-San Juan-Trinidad-Paramaribo-Belem-Natal:
(a) Natal-Dakar-Casablanca-Tangier-Madrid-Paris
(b) Natal-Dakar-Monrovia-Lagos or Accra-Brazzaville-
Johannesburg-Capetown. As alternate on express trips, the
route would be via Natal-Asencion Island-Lagos-Accra, or
Point Noire.




1 For example, see: Northeast Air, et al., North Atlantic Routes, 6 CAB 319
(1945) ; Additional Service to Latin America, 6 CAB 857 (1946) ; Northwest Air-
lines, et al., Pacific Case, 7 CAB 209 (1946); and American Overseas Airlines, et
al., South Atlantic Routes, 7 CAB 285 (1946).






8. Chicago-St. Paul-Minneapolis-Alaska and Seattle-Alaska. At least
one of these routes to be extended beyond Alaska to:
(a) Alaska-one or more intermediate points in Siberia-Vladivos-
tok-Mukden-Shanghai-Hong Kong (or Canton)-Hanoi-
Calcutta
(b) A leg from Mukden to Peiping and Chungking
(c) Alaska-Unalaska-Kiska-Paramushiru- Tokyo - Shanghai
-Hong Kong (or Canton)
9. Miami-San Juan-Trinidad-Belem:
(a) Belem-Fortaleza-Natal-Recife-Victoria-Rio de Janeiro
(b) Belem-Barreiras-Rio de Janeiro:
(1) Rio de Janeiro-Porto Alegre-Montevideo-Buenos
Aires






13. New Orleans-Merida-Guatemala City





(a) Arica-La Paz-Buenos Aires
(b) Arica-Santiago-Buenos Aires
(c) Arica-Antofagasta-Salta-Buenos Aires and certain con-
necting services
16. New York-a point in southeastern United States-Ciudad Trujillo or
Port-au-Prince-Caracas-Manaos:
(a) Manaos-Coiania-Bello Horizonte-Rio de Janeiro
(b) Manaos-Cuyaba-Corumba-Asuncion-Buenos Aires-Mon-
tevideo
17. New Orleans-Havana-Santiago-Port-au-Prince-Ciudad Trujillo-
San Juan
18. Tampa-Havana
19. Balboa-Cali-Iquitos-La Paz-Buenos Aires
20. New York-Charleston-Nassau-a point or points in Cuba-Kingston
-Balboa (or Cristobal)
